We propose two rational expectation models of transient financial bubbles with heterogeneous arbitrageurs and positive feedbacks leading to self-reinforcing transient stochastic faster-than-exponential price dynamics. As a result of the nonlinear feedbacks, the termination of a bubble is found to be characterized by a finite-time singularity in the bubble price formation process ending at some potential critical timet c , which follows a mean-reversing stationary dynamics. Because of the heterogeneity of the rational agents' expectations, there is a synchronization problem for the optimal exit times determined by these arbitrageurs, which leads to the survival of the bubble almost all the way to its theoretical end time. The explicit exact analytical solutions of the two models provide nonlinear transformations which allow us to develop novel tests for the presence of bubbles in financial time series. Avoiding the difficult problem of parameter estimation of the stochastic differential equation describing the price dynamics, the derived operational procedures allow us to diagnose bubbles that are in the making and to forecast their termination time. The tests performed on three financial markets, the US S&P500 index from 1
Introduction
Bubbles and crashes in financial markets are of global significance because of their effects on the lives and livelihoods of a majority of the world's population. While pundits and experts alike line up after the fact to claim that a particular bubble was obvious in hindsight, the real time development of the bubble is often characterized by either a deafening silence or a cacophony of contradictory opinions. Here, we propose two models of financial bubbles, from which we develop the corresponding operational procedures to diagnose bubbles that are in the making and to forecast their termination time.
The tests performed on three financial markets, the US S&P500 index from 1 February 1980 to 31 October 2008, the US NASDAQ composite index from 1 January 1980 to 31 July 2008 and the Hong Kong Hang Seng index from 1 December 1986 to 30 November 2008, demonstrate the feasibility of advance bubble warning on the major market regimes that were followed by crashes or extended market downturns. The empirical results support the hypothesis that financial bubbles result from positive feedbacks operating on the price and/or on its momentum, leading to faster-than-exponential transients.
These results should be appreciated from the perspective of the present state-of-art on modeling and detecting bubbles. There is no really satisfactory theory of bubbles, which both encompasses its different possible mechanisms and adheres to reasonable economic principles (no or limited arbitrage, equilibrium or quasi-equilibrium with only transient deviations, bounded rationality). Part of the reason that the literature is still uncertain on even how to define a bubble is that an exponentially growing price can always be argued to result from some fundamental economic factor (Gurkaynak, 2008; Lux and Sornette, 2002) . This is related to the problem that the fundamental price is not directly observable, giving no strong anchor to understand observed prices. Another fundamental difficulty is to go beyond equilibrium to out-of-equilibrium set-ups (Brock, 1993; Brock and Hommes, 1999; Chiarella et al., 2008; Hommes and Wagener, 2008) .
Two conditions are in general invoked as being necessary for prices to deviate from fundamental value. First, there must be some degree of irrationality in the market. That is, investors' demand for stocks must be driven by something other than fundamentals, like overconfidence in the future. Second, even if a market has such investors, the general argument is that rational investors will drive prices back to fundamental value. For this not to happen, there needs to be some limits on arbitrage. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provide a description for various limits of arbitrage. With respect to the equity market, clearly the most important impediment to arbitrage are short sales restrictions. Roughly 70% of mutual funds explicitly state (in SEC Form N-SAR) that they are not permitted to sell short (Almazan et al., 2004) . Seventy-nine percent of equity mutual funds make no use of derivatives whatsoever (either futures or options), suggesting further that funds do not take synthetically short positions (Koski and Pontiff, 1999) . These figures indicate that the vast majority of funds never take short positions. Then, the argument goes that bubbles can develop because prices reflect mainly the remaining optimistic opinions and not the negative views of pessimistic traders who are already out of the market, and who would take short positions, if given the opportunity.
One important class of theories shows that there can be large movements in asset prices due to the combined effects of heterogeneous beliefs and short-sales constraints. The basic idea finds its root in the original CAPM theories, in particular, the model of Lintner (1969) of asset prices with investors having heterogeneous beliefs. Lintner and many others after him, show that widely inflated prices can occur (Miller, 1977; Jarrow, 1980; Harrison and Kreps, 1978; Chen et al., 2002; Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003; Duffie et al., 2002) . In these models that assume heterogeneous beliefs and short sales restrictions, the asset prices are determined at equilibrium to the extent that they reflect the heterogeneous beliefs about payoffs. But short sales restrictions force the pessimistic investors out of the market, leaving only optimistic investors and thus inflated asset price levels. However, when short sales restrictions no longer bind investors, then prices fall back down. This provides a possible account of the bursting of the Internet bubble that developed in 1998-2000. Many of these models take into account explicitly the relationship between the number of publicly tradable shares of an asset and the propensity for speculative bubbles to form. So far, the theoretical models based on agents with heterogeneous beliefs facing short sales restrictions are considered among the most convincing models to explain the burst of the Internet bubbles.
The role of "noise traders" in fostering positive feedback trading has been emphasized by a number of models. For instance, DeLong et al. (1990) introduced a model of market bubbles and crashes which exploits this idea of the role of noise traders in the development of bubbles, as a possible mechanism for why asset prices may deviate from the fundamentals over rather long time periods. Their work was followed by a number of behavioral models based on the idea that trend chasing by one class of agents produces momentum in stock prices (Barberis et al., 1998; Daniel et al., 1998; Hong et al., 2005 ). An influential empirical evidence on momentum strategies came from the work of Titman (1993, 2001) , which established that stock returns exhibit momentum behavior at intermediate horizons. Strategies which buy stocks that have performed well in the past and sell stocks that have performed poorly in the past generate significant positive returns over 3-to 12-month holding periods. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) documented long-term reversals in stock returns. Stocks that perform poorly in the past perform better over the next 3 to 5 years than stocks that perform well in the past. These findings present a serious challenge to the view that markets are semi-strong-form efficient.
It is important to understand what mechanisms prevent arbitrageurs from removing a bubble as soon as they see one. Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) have proposed that bubbles continue to grow due to a failure of synchronization of rational traders, so that the later choose to ride rather than arbitrage bubbles. Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) consider a market where arbitrageurs face synchronization risk and, as a consequence, delay usage of arbitrage opportunities. Rational arbitrageurs are supposed to know that the market will eventually collapse. They know that the bubble will burst as soon as a sufficient number of (rational) traders will sell out. However, the dispersion of rational arbitrageurs' opinions on market timing and the consequent uncertainty on the synchronization of their sell-off are delaying this collapse, allowing the bubble to grow. In this framework, bubbles persist in the short and intermediate term because short sellers face synchronization risk, that is, uncertainty regarding the timing of the correction. As a result, arbitrageurs who conclude that the arbitrageurs are yet unlikely to trade against the bubble find it optimal to ride the still-growing bubble for a while. Bhattacharya and Yu (2008) provide a summary of recent efforts to expand on the above concepts, in particular to address the two main questions of (i) the cause(s) of bubbles and crashes and (ii) the possibility to diagnose them ex-ante. Many financial economists recognize that positive feedbacks and in particular herding is a key factor for the growth of bubbles. Herding can result from a variety of mechanisms, such as anticipation by rational investors of noise traders' strategies (DeLong et al., 1990) , agency costs and monetary incentives given to competing fund managers (Dass et al., 2008) sometimes leading to the extreme Ponzi schemes, rational imitation in the presence of uncertainty (Roehner and Sornette, 2000) and social imitation. The bubble models developed here build strongly on this accepted notion of herding. We refer to Kaizoji and Sornette (2008) for an extensive review complementing this brief survey.
The present paper takes its roots in the Johansen-Ledoit-Sornette (JLS) model (Johansen et al., 1999 (Johansen et al., , 2000 formulated in the Blanchard-Watson framework of rational expectation bubbles (Blanchard, 1979; Blanchard and Watson, 1982) . The JLS model combined a representation of the herding behavior of noise traders controlling a crash hazard rate with the arbitrage response of rational traders on the asset price. One implication of the JLS model is the transient faster-than-exponential acceleration of the price due to the positive feedback associated with the herding behavior of noise traders. This faster-than-exponential pattern can theoretically culminate in a finite-time singularity, which characterizes the end of the bubble and the time at which the crash is the most probable. Other models have explored further the hypothesis that bubbles can be the result of positive feedbacks and that the dynamical signature of bubbles derives from the interplay between fundamental value investment and more technical analysis. The former can be embodied in nonlinear extensions of the standard financial Black-Scholes model of log-price variations (Sornette and Andersen, 2002; Ide and Sornette, 2002; Corcos et al., 2002; Andersen and Sornette, 2004) . The later requires more significant extensions to account for the competition between inertia between analysis and decisions, positive momentum feedbacks and negative value investment feedbacks . Close to our present formulation, Sornette and Andersen (2002) ; Andersen and Sornette (2004) develop a nonlinear generalization of the Black-Scholes process which can be solved analytically. The nonlinear feedback is acting as the effect of price on future growth, according to the view that high prices lead to a wealth effect that drives behavioral investors to invest more aggressively.
The present paper adds to the literature by developing two related models of transient bubbles in which their terminations occur at some potential critical timet c , which follows a mean-reversing stationary process with a fixed unconditional mean T c . These models provides straightforward ways to determine the potential critical time without confronting the difficult problem of parameter estimation of the stochastic differential equation describing the price dynamics of price. In our models, rational arbitrageurs can diagnose bubbles but do not know precisely when they end. These investors are assumed to form rational expectations of the potential critical time but not necessarily of the detailed price process itself, which form a much weaker condition for investors' rationality. Furthermore, we assume that rational arbitrageurs hold consistent expectation for the potential critical time with unbiased errors. Although rational arbitrageurs know that the bubble will burst at its critical time, they can not make a deterministic prediction of this time and therefore of when other arbitrageurs will sell out, because they have little knowledge about others' belief about the process governing the stochastic critical timet c . Our rational investors continuously update their beliefs on the probable termination of the bubble, according to their observation of the development of the bubble. They exit the market by maximizing their expected payoff, based on their subjective perception of the market bubble risk and the knowledge of the bubble dynamics. Because of the heterogeneity of these rational agents' expectations, there is a synchronization problem between these arbitrageurs, which leads to the survival of the bubble almost all the way to its theoretical end time. In this respect, our model is reminiscent to that of Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) , since the resilience of the bubble results from the lack of synchronization between arbitrageurs on the decision to exit the bubble due to the heterogeneity of their optimal exit times. Our models have the advantage of being quantitatively testable and their concrete implementation provides diagnostics of bubbles in real time series, as we demonstrate below.
The first model, which leads to a finite-time singularity in the price dynamics with stochastic critical time is presented in the next section 2. This model generalizes Sornette and Andersen's model to allow for a mean reversal dynamics of the bubble end. Section 3 present a second model leading to a finite-time singularity in the momentum price dynamics with stochastic critical time. Both models exemplify the importance of positive feedback, which is quantified by a unique exponent m. A value of m larger than 1 (respectively 2) characterize a bubble regime in the first (respectively second) model. The two models can be solved exactly in explicit analytical forms. These solutions provide nonlinear transformations which allow us to develop novel tests for the presence of bubbles in financial time series. These two classes of tests, one for each bubble model, are developed respectively in subsections 4.1 and 4.2 and applied on three financial markets, the US S&P500 index from 1 2 First bubble model: finite-time singularity in the price dynamics with stochastic critical time
Financial bubbles are often viewed as being characterized by anomalously high growth rates resulting from temporary over-optimistic beliefs in a 'new economy' or in a 'paradigm shift' of the fundamental structure of productivity gains. However, this definition is unsatisfactory because a high growth rate associated with an exponentially growing price can always be justified by some other fundamental valuation models which use higher discount factors and larger dividend growth expectations, or introduce new accounting rules incorporating for instance the benefits of real options. This definition also leaves a large ambiguity as to when the bubble is supposed to end, or when a crash might occur.
In contrast, we define a bubble as a transient faster-than-exponential growth of the price, which would end in a finite-time-singularity in the absence of a crash or change of regime. Such 'superexponential regime' results from the existence of positive nonlinear feedback mechanisms amplifying past price increases into even faster growth rates. These positive nonlinear feedback mechanisms may be due to a variety of causes, including derivative hedging strategies, portfolio insurance methods or to imitative behaviors of bounded rational arbitrageurs and of noise traders. While herding has been largely documented to be a trait of noise traders, it is actually rational for bounded rational agents to also enter into social imitation, as the collective behavior may reveal information otherwise hidden to the agents. As a result of the nonlinear positive feedbacks, the bubble price becomes less and less coupled to the market fundamentals, and the super-exponential growth of the price makes the market more and more unstable. In this scenario, the end of the bubble conditional on the absence of crash occurs at a critical time at which the market becomes maximally unstable. The end of the bubble is therefore the time when the crash is the most probable. With or without a crash, the end of the bubble signals the end of the transient super-exponential growth, and the transition to a different regime, with unspecified characteristics.
Here, we assume that sophisticated market participants are indeed aware of the current bubble state, and that they know the price is growing towards its final singularity which will occur at some future random critical time at which the market may collapse with a finite probability (but not with certainty). Our bounded rational agents are able to form unbiased rational expectations of the critical time corresponding to the end of the bubble at which the crash is the more probable. We assume that these sophisticated arbitrageurs enter sequentially into the market, attracted by the potential large gains, given their anticipation of the crash risk quantified by their estimation of the critical end time of the bubble which is formed when they enter the market. Because their anticipations of the bubble demise are heterogeneous, they solve an optimal timing problem with distinct inputs, which leads to different exit strategies. The heterogeneity in their exit strategies is common knowledge among these arbitrageurs, and results in a lack of coordination, ensuring the persistence of the bubble. This synchronization problem is analogous to that identified by Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) . However, for Abreu and Brunnermeier, the lack of synchronization stems from the existence of heterogeneous beliefs on the start of the bubble, i.e., arbitrageurs have "sequential awareness" and do not know whether they have learn the information on the mispricing early or late relative to other rational arbitrageurs. In contrast, our model emphasizes that the lack of synchronization results from the heterogeneous beliefs concerning the end of the bubble. Many reports both in the academic and professional literature state that sophisticated participants like hedge-funds correctly diagnosed the presence of a bubble and actually "surfed" the bubbles, attracted by the potential large gains. Many reported that the largest uncertainty was how long it would continue its course (Gurkaynak, 2008; Sullivan, 2009) Less sophisticated traders investing in the market have little knowledge on the bubble duration and their action add noise which is assumed to have an influence only on the critical time characterizing the end of the bubble, while the super-exponential growth of the price remains robust. In the bubble regime, a well-defined nonlinear exponent characterizes the positive feedbacks at the origin of the bubble. The noisy character of the critical time t c of the end of the bubble is modeled by an OrnsteinUhlenbeck process. Intuitively, the price trail resembles the trace of a bug climbing erratically along a hanging curved rope attached to a vibrating support.
Specifically, the price dynamics in the bubble regime is assumed to be described by the following stochastic differential equation:
where the exponent m > 1 embodies the positive feedback mechanism, in which a high price p pushes even further the demand so that the return and its volatility tend to be a nonlinear accelerating function of p. When m > 1, we will show that the price diverges in finite time. The time at which this divergence occurs is referred to as the critical timet c . As we will see later, the term δ(x, t) is a time-varying regulator term that governs the behavior oft c , µ is the instantaneous return rate, σ is the volatility of the returns and W is the standard Wiener process. This model recovers the standard Black-Scholes model of the geometric random walk with drift µ and standard deviation σ for m = 1 and δ = 0. Let us consider first the case where δ(p, t) = σ = 0, so that expression (1) reduces to dp = µp m dt, whose solution is
where
and p 0 denotes the price at the start time of the bubble taken to be t = 0. Since β > 0 for m > 1, expression (2) exemplifies the existence of a finite-time (or "movable" , Bender and Orszag (1999) ) singularity of the price that goes to infinity in finite time as t → t − c . This pathological behavior is the direct consequence of the positive feedback embodied in the condition m > 1.
Motivated by this simple analytical solution, we now consider the more general process (1) and specify δ(p, t) in order to obtain a general process with stochastic finite time singularities. We postulate the following specific form for the process governing δ(p, t),
follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with zero unconditional mean. The Wiener process in (4) is the same as the one in (1). We obtain the following result.
Proposition 1. Provided that δ(p, t) follows the process (3) with (4), the solution of equation (1) can be written under a form similar to (2) as follows,
The proof of Proposition (1) is given in Appendix A.
Note that
Therefore, T c given in (6) is the expected time at which the bubble will end in an explosive singularity. The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process (4) fort c (t) expresses that the end of the bubble cannot be known with certainty but is instead a stochastic variable. Nonetheless, due to the positive feedback, the price can explode in finite time, but the end of the bubble can at best be known to follow the meanreversing process (4). The time T c can be interpreted as the consensus rational expectation formed by sophisticated arbitrageurs of the stochastic critical time T c as which the bubble is expected to end. But each trading day t discloses a different 'actual' critical time T c + t c (t) which is vibrating around its expected value T c . Our model assumes that there is no coordination mechanism that would ensure the exchange of information among the sophisticated arbitrageurs concerning their expectation of the end of the bubble. The arbitrageurs reveal their private information only upon entering the market. We assume that they do so sequentially, based on their heterogeneous beliefs on the processt c . And the process t c is an emergent property that results from the aggregation of market beliefs rather than from the action of single arbitrageur. Being aware of the escalating level of the bubble that has not yet burst, each arbitrageur will ride the bubble for a while and identify the best exit strategy according to the maximization of her risk-adjusted return based on her belief.
Let us denote t i > 0 the time at which the i's arbitrageur has entered the market. Being aware of the form (5) of the price dynamics, at each instant t, the rational arbitrageur forms a belief quantified by her hazard rate h i (t), of the probability that a crash might occur in the next instant, conditional on the fact that it has not yet happened. This allows her to estimate the probability 1 − Π i (t) that the crash will not happen until time t. Given the explosive form (5) of the price dynamics, we assume that the arbitrageur forms a belief of the crash hazard rate which is of the same form, that is,
where Π i (t) is the arbitrageur i's conditional cumulative distribution function of the bursting date and π i (t) represents the associated conditional density. T c,i = T c +t c,i denotes the critical time for the end of the bubble that the arbitrageur i has estimated when entering the market. We allow the exponent β i to be different from arbitrageur to arbitrageur, so as to reflect different views on the riskiness of the market, which can translate into distinct risk aversions: the larger the exponent β i , the more pessimistic is the view of the arbitrageur concerning the imminence of the crash, because a larger β i implies a faster divergence of the crash hazard rate. The occurrence of the market collapse is posited to be triggered when a sufficiently large number η of arbitrageurs have exited the market, leading to a large price movement, amplified by the herding of noise traders. Their cumulative effect is accounted for by a postulated percent loss κ of the crash, which is itself a random variable. Given such an environment, the date to exit the market for a given rational arbitrageur i determines her best trade strategy, which is found as the solution of the following optimization problem max
The first term (1 − Π i (t)) · dp represents the arbitrageur's instantaneous benefit at t + dt provided that the burst of the bubble has not yet happened. The second term π i (t)dt · κp is the instantaneous cost supported by the arbitrageur when the bubble bursts. The solution of (9) is obtained from the first-order condition
We can thus state Proposition 2. Given a population of heterogeneous arbitrageurs, which form their expectation of the crash hazard rate according to (8) with heterogeneous anticipated critical times T c,i and exponents β i reflecting their different views on the riskiness of the market, a given arbitrageur i decides to exit the market at the date t ex i which is the solution of
Since
Notwithstanding the fact that the presence of the bubble is common knowledge among all rational arbitrageurs, the absence of synchronization of their market exit allows the bubble to persist and run its course up to a time close to its expected value (7).
For the price process (1) with (3), equation (11) yields
This synchronization problem is analogous to that identified by Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) , with the important difference that we emphasize that the lack of synchronization results from the heterogeneous beliefs concerning the end of the bubble. The corresponding observable logarithmical return for the asset price reads
where τ is the time interval between two observations of the price. In the case where T c is large enough such that T c +t c (t) − t ∆t c (t) − τ , expression (13) can be approximated by its first order Taylor expansion:
Therefore, under the condition m → 1 and T c +t c (t) − t → ∞, the logarithmical return r τ (t) is driven by the change ∆t c (t) of the critical time on each trading day. Althought c follows an OrnsteinUhlenbeck process, i.e., ∆t c (t) = −αt c (t) + ε t , the existence of correlation between successive returns will be hardly detectable if α is small enough. Conversely, ift c follows a unit root process, the logarithmical return r τ (t) is only dependent on the realization of the gaussian noise term ε. In this sense, only if T c is not too far in the future, m is sufficiently larger than 1 andt c is stationary, can we diagnose the existence of a bubble, characterized by the emergence of a transient super-exponential price growth of the form (5).
3 Second bubble model: finite-time singularity in the momentum price dynamics with stochastic critical time
The price process (5) of the first bubble model might appear extreme, in the sense that the price diverges on the approach of the critical time T c of the end of the bubble. However, such a divergence cannot run its full course in our model due to the divergence of the crash hazard rate which ensures that a crash will occur before. The critical time is thus a ghost-like time, which is out-of-reach, and the price process (5) describes a transient run-up that would diverge only in the hypothetical absence of any arbitrageur. Here, we consider an alternative model in which the price remains always finite but the faster-than-exponential growth associated with the bubble is embodied into the price momentum, i.e., the derivative of the logarithm of the price or logarithmic return. Defining y(t) = ln p(t), we assume the following process for y(t):
where the same Wiener process W (t) acts on both dy and dx. The process x(t) plays the role of an effective price momentum. To see this, consider the special case γ(x, t) = 0. Then, expression (15) reduces to dy = xdt + (σ/µ)xdW , which shows that x(t)dt = E[dy] and thus x(t) is the average momentum of the price, defined as the instantaneous time derivative of the expected logarithm of the price. The dynamics of the log-price described by (15) with (16) is similar to previous models (Bouchaud and Cont, 1998; Farmer, 2002; Ide and Sornette, 2002; Sornette and Ide, 2002) , which argued for the presence of some inertia in the price formation process. This inertia is related to the momentum effect Titman, 1993, 2001; Carhart, 1997; Xue, 2003; Cooper et al., 2004) . Intuitively, a price process involving both dy and dx holds if the price variation from today to tomorrow is based in part on decisions using analyses of the price change between yesterday (and possibly earlier times) and today. In the (unrealistic) deterministic limit γ(x, t) = δ(x, t) = σ = 0, the two equations (15) and (16) reduce to the deterministic equation
whose solution reads, for m > 2,
−β and A = p(T c ). The condition m > 2 ensures that 0 < 1 − β < 1. Therefore, the log-price y(t) exhibits a finite-time singularity (FTS) at T c . But this FTS is of a different type than in the model of the previous section: here, y(t) remains finite at t = T c and equal to some value A = p(T c ). The singularity is expressed via the divergence of the momentum x(t) = dy/dt which diverges at t = T c . As in the previous model, this FTS embodies the positive feedback mechanism, in which a high price momentum x pushes even further the demand so that the return and its volatility tend to be nonlinear accelerating functions of x. In the previous model, it is the price that provides a feedback on further price moves, rather than the price momentum used here.
Motivated by this simple analytical solution (18), we complement the general process (15,16) by specifying γ(x, t) and δ(p, t) in order to obtain solutions with stochastic finite time singularities in the momentum with finite prices. We postulate the following specific processes
follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with zero unconditional mean. The Wiener process in (21) is the same as the one in (15,16), which reflects that the same series of news or shocks move log-price, momentum and anticipated critical time. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 3. Provided that γ(x, t) and δ(p, t) follow the processes given respectively by (19) and (20), then the solution of (15,16) for the log-price y(t) = ln p(t) can be written under a form similar to expression (18) as follows,
and A is a constant.
The proof of Proposition 3 is given in appendix B. Expression (22) describes a log-price trajectory exhibiting a FTS occurring at an unknown future critical time T c +t c (t) which itself follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck walk. In the same manner as in the previous model of the preceding section, we assume that there is no coordination mechanism that would ensure the exchange of information among the sophisticated arbitrageurs concerning their expectation of the time T c +t c (t) of the end of the bubble. Following step by step the same reasoning as in the previous section, we conclude that Proposition 2 also holds for the present model. Being aware of the escalating level of the bubble that has not yet burst, each arbitrageur will ride the bubble for a while and identify the best exit strategy according to the maximization of her risk-adjusted return based on her belief. Proposition 2 determines that the exit time t ex i for arbitrageur i is the solution of
The observable logarithmic return for the asset price corresponding to (22) reads
For future potential critical times T c sufficiently far away from the present time t such that T c +t c (t)− t ∆t c (t) − τ , expression (26) can be simplified into
Eq.(27) has a structure similar to that of Eq.(14). For weak positive feedback of the momentum on itself (m → 2 + ) and when T c is large enough so that µ(T c +t c (t) − t) is slowly varying, then the logarithmical return r s is essentially driven by ∆t c (t), i.e., the change of critical time disclosed by every trading day is the main stochastic process. The Geometric Brownian Motion is then recovered as an approximation in this limit when the correlation time of the Orstein-Uhlenbeck process driving the critical goes to zero.
Empirical tests of the two bubble models
We have proposed two models in which a financial bubble is characterized by a transient faster-thanexponential growth culminating into a finite-time singularity at some potential critical time. Because our two models reduce to a standard GBM in appropriate limits, the diagnostic of the presence of bubbles according to our two models lies in the conjunction of three pieces of evidence that characterize specific deviations from the GBM regime: (i) the proximity of the calibrated potential critical date T c to the end of the time window in which the calibration of the models are made; (ii) the reconstructed time series of the critical timet c should be stationary and thus reject a standard unit-root test; (iii) the critical exponent m should be significant larger than 1, a condition for the existence of the super-exponential regime proposed to characterize bubbles.
Construction of alarms from the first model
Given a financial time series of close prices at the daily scale, our purpose is to develop a procedure using the model of section 2 to diagnose the presence of bubbles. We use time windows of 750 trading days that we slide with a time step of 25 days from the beginning to the end of the available financial time series. The number of such windows is therefore equal to the total number of trading days in the financial time series minus 750 and divided by 25. For each window, the purpose is to decide if the model of section 2 diagnoses an on-going bubble or not and then to compare with the actual subsequent realization of a crash that we consider as the validation step.
For each window ]t i − 750, t i ] ending at t i , we transform the price time series in that window into a critical time series by inverting expression (5) for T c,i (t):
The critical time series T c,i (t) is defined over the window i ending at t i . If the model was exact and no stochastic component was present, and in absence of estimation errors, T c,i (t) would be a constant equal to T c defined in (6). In the presence of an expected strong stochastic component, we estimate T c according to (7) as the arithmetical average of T c,i (t)
We can then constructt c,i (t) ast
The transformation (28) from a non-stationary possibly explosive price process p(t) into what should be a stationary time series T c,i (t) in absence of misspecification is a key element of our methodology for bubble detection that avoids the problems documented by Granger and Newbold (1974) and Phillips (1986) resulting from direct calibration of price or log-price time series.
It will not have escaped the attention of the reader that the transformation (28) requires the knowledge of the two unknown parameters K and β that specify the bubble process (5). We propose to determine these two parameters by applying an optimization procedure as follows. Recall that a crucial ingredient of the bubble model is the mean reversal nature of the potential critical timet c . This suggests to apply a unit root test on the reconstructed time seriest c,i (t) and determine the optimal values K * i and β * i as those which make the time seriest c,i (t) as stationary as possible. We proceed in two steps. We first search in the space of the two parameters K and β and select an elite list of the ten best pairs (K, β) (when they exist) which reject a standard unit-root test of non-stationarity at the 99.5% significance level. We implement this procedure with the t-test statistic of the Dickey-Fuller unit-root test (without intercept). Since the Dickey-Fuller test is a lower test, the smaller the statistics t, the larger is the probability to reject the null hypothesis thatt c has unit-root (is non-stationary). Of course, only a subset of the windows will yield any solution at all, i.e., it is quite often the case that the Dickey-Fuller unit-root test is not rejected at the 99.5% significance level for any pair (K, β). For those windows for which there are selected pairs (K, β) according to the Dickey-Fuller test, we choose the one with the smallest variance for its corresponding time seriest c,i (t), i.e., such that thẽ t c,i (t)'s are the closest to their mean in the variance sense. This yields the optimal K * i and β * i that best "fit" the window i in the sense that this pair of parameters provides the closest approximation to a stationary time series fort c,i (t) given by expression (30) for the potential termination of the bubble.
For a given window i, a diagnostic for the presence of bubble is flagged and an alarm is declared when (i) β * > 0 such that m > 1 (the signature of a positive feedback in our model) and
(ii) T c,i − t i < 750, i.e., the estimated termination time of the bubble is not too distant.
Figs.1-3 depicts all the bubble alarms obtained by applying this procedure to three major stock indices, the US S&P500 index from 1 February 1980 to 31 October 2008, the US NASDAQ composite index from 1 January 1980 to 31 July 2008 and the Hong Kong Hang Seng index from 1 December 1986 to 30 November 2008. An alarm is indicated by a vertical line positioned on the last day t i of the corresponding window that passes the two criteria (i-ii). We refine the diagnostic by presenting three alarm levels, corresponding respectively to T c,i − t i < 750, T c,i − t i < 500 and T c,i − t i < 250: the closer the estimated termination of the bubble, the stronger should be the evidence for the bubble as a faster-than-exponential growth. Another indication is the existence of clustering of the alarms. If indeed a bubble is developing, it should be diagnosed repeatedly by several successive windows. Fig.1 for the S&P500 index shows that the alarm clusters correctly identify the upcoming of four significant market corrections or crashes. This suggests to qualify these alarms as correct diagnostic of bubbles ending in these corrections. The first one is the large cluster localized within 1.5 years before the 'Black Monday' crash of October 1987. The second smaller cluster is associated with a significant correction starting in July 17, 1990. The third large cluster is also within 1.5 year before the occurrence of the turmoil starting in August 1998, associated with the default of Russia on its debt and the devaluation of the ruble. The detection of a bubble starting to develop more than a year before this event suggests that this event may not have been entirely exogenous, supporting previous evidence for this claim (Sornette, 2004) . The fourth smaller cluster announced the turning point of the famous Internet-Communication-Technology (ICT) bubble in April 2000. We note that the strength of the bubble is quite weak for the S&P500 index. This can probably be explained by the fact that only about 20% of its constituting firms belonged to the ICT sector while the remaining 80% firms belonged to the "old economy" sector. In contrast, the alarm signal is much stronger for the Nasdaq index, as can be seen in figure 2 . One can observe a fifth rather small cluster of alarms for T c,i − t i < 750 (which however disappears for T c,i − t i < 500 or smaller, suggesting a weak signal) which is dated Sept. 12, 2005 in the top panel of Fig.1 . This alarm does not appear to be associated to any nearby termination of a rising price regime. However, notice that, in October 2007, the S&P500 peaked and then started a dramatic accelerating downward spiral fueled by the unfolding of the global financial crisis. This peak of October 2007 is indeed less than 750 trading days away from the triggering of the alarm on Sept. 12, 2005 . This supports other evidence that the run-up of the S&P500 from 2003 to October 2007 was a bubble (Sornette and Woodard, 2010) . It is however a failure of the present methodology that the alarm is short-lived and does not confirm the continuing accelerating trend up to the peak in October 2007. Fig. 2 paints a similar picture. A first bubble preceding the crash of October 1987 is clearly diagnosed. A very large cluster of alarms spans the period from at least early 1997 (Phillips et al., 2007) to 2000, confirming the diagnostic of a running ICT bubble, that ended with a crash in April 2000. This large cluster is actually made of two sub-clusters, the first one associated with the bubble behavior ending with the so-called Russian crisis at the end the summer of 1998, and the second one corresponding to the well-known ICT bubble reflecting over-optimistic expectation of a "new economy". This is similar to the analysis and conclusion obtained in Fig.1 for the S&P500 index. There is small cluster of alarms ending in April 1994, which cannot be associated with any large price movement afterwards. Finally, a fourth cluster of alarms is dated Sept. 12, 2005 in the top panel of Fig.2 . As for the S&P500 index, this cluster of alarms does not appear to be associated to any nearby termination of a rising price regime, but rather to the development of an accelerating upward trending price that culminated in October 2007 before crashing in the subsequent year.
Similar conclusions hold for the Hong Kong market, as shown in Fig.3 . One can observe the clusters of alarms associated with the successive booming phases of the Hang Seng index followed by several corrections or crashes. One can identify in particular the bubbles associated with the strong correction of 1992, the two Asian crises of 1994 and 1997, as well as the bubble ending in October 2007, which is this time very clearly diagnosed for this Hong Kong market. There is one isolated false alarm dated Feb. 1, 2001 in the top panel of Fig.3. 
Construction of alarms from the second model
Similarly to the procedure described in section 4.1, we transform a given price time series in a given window i of 900 successive trading days into what should be a stationary time series of potential critical end times, if the price series is indeed described by the bubble model of section 3. Inverting expression (22) in Proposition 3, we get, similarly to expression (28),
The critical time series T c,i (t) is defined within the window i ending at t i . If the model was exact and no stochastic component was present, and in absence of estimation errors, T c,i (t) would be a constant equal to T c defined in (23). The expected critical end time T c,i of a bubble, if any, is then estimated for this window i by expression (29) (with 750 replaced by 900). The fluctuations around T c,i are described byt c,i (t) defined by (30).
As for the first bubble model, the transformation (31) requires the determination of parameters, here the triplet (A, B, β). For this, we proceed exactly as in the previous subsection, with the DickeyFuller unit-root test applied to the time seriest c,i (t), followed by the selection of the best triplet (A * , B * , β * ) that minimize the variance of the time seriest c,i (t). The search of the additional parameter A is performed in an interval bounded from above by 2 max t i −899≤t≤t i ln p(t). Then, for a given window i, a diagnostic for the presence of bubble is flagged and an alarm is declared when (i) 0 < β * < 1 such that m > 2 (the signature of a positive feedback in the momentum price dynamics model) and (ii) −25 ≤ T c,i − t i ≤ 50, such that the estimated termination time of the bubble is close to the right side of the time window.
(iii) We further refine the filtering by considering three levels of significance quantified by the value of the exponent m: level 1 (m > 2), level 2 (m > 2.5) and level 3 (m > 3).
The condition T c,i − t i ≤ 50 is much more stringent that its counterpart for the first bubble model. The rational is that the price dynamics in terms of a finite-time singularity in the price momentum corresponds to a weaker singularity that can only be observed, in the presence of a strong stochastic component, rather close to the potential singularity. This explains the smaller upper bound of 50 trading days (corresponding approximately to two calendar months). The lower bound of −25 days accounts for the fact that the analysis is performed in sliding windows with a time step of 25 trading days.
The results shown in Figs.4-6 complement and refine those obtained with the bubble model tested in the previous subsection. In general, there are less alarms when using this second model and procedure, compared with the first bubble model and procedure of subsection 4.1. One can observe in Fig.4 for the S&P500 index two very well-defined clusters diagnosing a bubble ending with the crash of October 1987 and another bubble ending in October 2007. The dates indicated in the upper panel, Oct. 17, 1987 and Oct. 9, 2007, correspond to the right time of the last window in which an alarm is found for each of these two clusters. The timing is thus remarkably accurate in terms of the determination of the end of each bubble regime. It is interesting that this second model in terms of a momentum bubble singularity is able to diagnose unambiguously a bubble ending in October 2007, while the first model diagnosed only an intermediate phase of this price development. This bubble can be referred to as the "real-estate-MBS" bubble (MBS stands for morgage-backed security, Sornette and Woodard (2010) ). Using the level 1 filter for the positive feedback exponent m, we observe in addition three false alarms. Raising the condition that m should be larger than 2.5 (respectively 3) removes two (respectively all) of these false alarms. 
Concluding remarks
We have developed two rational expectation models of financial bubbles with heterogeneous rational arbitrageurs. Two key ingredients characterize these models: (i) the existence of a positive feedback quantified by a nonlinear power law dependence of price growth as a function of either price or momentum; (ii) the stochastic mean-reversion dynamics of the termination time of the bubble. The first model characterizes a bubble as a faster-than-exponential accelerating stochastic price ending in a finite-time singularity at a stochastic critical time. The second model views a bubble as a regime characterized by an accelerating momentum ending at a finite time singularity, also with at a stochastic critical time. This second model has the additional feature of taking into account the existence of some inertia in the price formation process, which is related to the momentum effect.
In these two models, the heterogeneous arbitrageurs exhibit distinct perception for the rising risk of a crash as the bubble develops. Each arbitrageur is assumed to know the price formation process and to determine her exit time so as to maximize her expected gain. The resulting distribution of exit times lead to a synchronization problem, preventing arbitraging of the bubble and allowing it to continue its course up to close to its potential critical time.
The explicit analytical solutions of the two models allow us to propose nonlinear transformations of the price time series into stochastic critical time series. The qualification of a bubble regime then boils down to characterize the nature of the transformed stochastic critical time series, thereby avoiding the difficult problem of parameter estimation of the stochastic differential equation describing the price dynamics. We develop an operational procedure that qualifies the existence of a running bubble (i) if the critical time series is found to reject a standard unit-root test at a high confidence level, (ii) if the exponent m of the nonlinear power law characterizing the positive feedback is sufficient large and (iii) if the expected critical time is not too distant from the time of the analysis.
The two procedures derived from the two bubble models have been applied to three financial markets, the US S&P500 index from 1 February 1980 to 31 October 2008, the US NASDAQ composite index from 1 January 1980 to 31 July 2008 and the Hong Kong Hang Seng index from 1 December 1986 to 30 November 2008. Specifically, we have developed criteria to flag an alarm for the presence of a bubble, that we validate by determining if the diagnosed bubble is followed by a crash in short order. Remarkably, we find that the major known crashes over these periods are correctly identified with few false alarms. The method using the second bubble model in terms of a finite-time singularity of the price momentum seems to be more reliable with fewer false alarms and a better detection of the two principal bubbles phases characterizing the last 30 years or so.
These results suggest the feasibility of advance bubble warning. 
